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The New Trade Theory predicts that international trade lowers prices for consumers and 
expands the choices available to them. This study shows that both predictions may no longer 
hold once adjustments in the retail sector are taken into account. I present a new model of 
retailing in general equilibrium and explore its implications for a number of different shocks. 
The results demonstrate that retail assortments may remain constant if consumers have a low 
preference for diversity, and that consumer prices can even rise if the retail density is 
sufficiently low. 
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The modern theory of international trade identiﬁes an expansion in the choices for con-
s u m e r sa n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h e i rr e a li n c o m eas the key gains from trade (Krugman, 1979,
1980, for the seminal theoretical contributions; Broda and Weinstein, 2006, for a recent em-
pirical investigation). Because international trade enlarges the markets for manufacturers,
the equilibrium number of ﬁr m si na ni n t e g r a t e dg l o b a le c o n o m yi sl a r g e rt h a nt h en u m b e ro f
ﬁrms in any national economy under autarky. As a consequence, product diversity rises and
consumers can choose from a larger menu of diﬀerentiated varieties. In addition, demand
becomes more elastic and ﬁrms can realize economies of scale, so that producer prices fall
and real incomes rise.
However, consumers typically do not buy their products directly from manufacturers but
travel to local retail outlets for their purchases. Hence, the choices available to consumers
and the prices paid are also aﬀected by the market structure in retailing, in particular by
the local availability of retail outlets, by the assortment sizes of local retailers, and by their
mark-ups. Thus, for a full assessment of the impact of international trade on a country’s
w e l f a r ew eh a v et ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n th o wt h em a r k e ts t r u c t u r ei nr e t a i l i n gi sa ﬀected.
Surprisingly, the retail sector has received very little attention in the theory of interna-
tional trade. Some recent studies have focused on contracting issues between manufacturers
and retailers (Richardson, 2004; Raﬀ and Schmitt, 2005, 2006, 2007), others on the pass-
through of import into retail prices (Hellerstein, 2008; Raﬀ and Schmitt, 2008), on the role
of "big box" retailers for import volumes (Javorcik et al., 2008; Basker and Van, 2008), or
on the role of intermediaries in overcoming informational barriers in international markets
(Rauch, 2001; Rauch and Casella, 2003; Feenstra and Hanson, 2004). All of these studies
emphasize that the interactions between retailers and manufacturers are important for the
eﬀects of international trade. However, because they are all conducted in partial equilibrium,
they cannot yield any predictions as to how adjustments in retailing aﬀect an economy’s real
income or the choices available to its consumers.
This paper establishes a link between international trade in monopolistically compet-
itive industries and the market structure in retailing in a general equilibrium framework.
It addresses two questions: First, how does international trade aﬀect local retail market
structures? And second, do these adjustments in the retail industries alter our predictions
regarding the welfare implications of international trade? Our model’s predictions are in line
with a number of stylized facts. The retail industries in most industrialized countries have
gone through immense structural changes over the past decades. There is overwhelming
evidence that the level of concentration has increased signiﬁcantly and that the overall num-
ber of retail outlets has declined (Dobson and Waterson, 1999; Clarke, 2000; Dawson, 2001;
Dobson et al., 2001; Blanchard and Lyson, 2002, 2003; Weiss and Wittkopp, 2005; U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, 2006). At the same time, retail assortments (the number of products
stocked) have risen signiﬁcantly (Competition Commission, 2000; Richards and Hamilton,
2006) and the number of gigantic retailers, so-called superstores, has even increased in ab-
solute terms despite the overall decline in retail outlets (Dobson et al., 2001; Dobson et al.,
2003). These changes were accompanied by an increase in retail gross margins (Dobson et
al., 1998; Dobson and Waterson, 1999, Competition Commission, 2000; U.S. Census Bureau,
2008). Naturally, international trade is not solely r e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h ec h a n g e si nt h er e t a i l
1market structures. But I argue that it is a distinct force in these developments, and that
the adjustments triggered in the retailing industries have to be taken into account when
assessing the welfare implications of international trade.
By incorporating a retailing sector into a general equilibrium model of intra-industry
trade we are able to isolate mechanisms through which international trade can aﬀect the
market structure in retailing, calculate their welfare implications, and compare them to the
traditional gains from trade. This paper makes two main points: First, the provision of goods
is costly for retailers, and this creates a trade-oﬀ between the size of retail assortments and
the density of retail outlets. Because of this trade-oﬀ, a trade-induced increase in product
diversity can contribute to the consolidation in retailing, leading to higher retail mark-ups
and potentially lowering real incomes. And second, retailers may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to limit
their assortment sizes and charge slotting allowances for the scarce retail shelf space. In our
framework, this is a viable strategy if consumers have a low preference for diversity. In this
case, international trade may lead to an increase in imported varieties, but local product
diversity remains constant.
The model presented here takes the general setup of a Krugman (1979, 1980)-type model
of intra-industry trade with regard to consumer preferences (Dixit-Stiglitz) and manufactur-
ing ﬁrms (horizontally diﬀerentiated, with ﬁxed and variable labor costs) and adds a spatial
component for the retailing industry based on the monocentric city model à la Alonso (1964)
and the spatial model by Salop (1979) used in industrial organization. The economy has a
circular structure where consumers (who are also workers) live on a circle around a Central
Business District (CBD) and travel to the nearest local retailer for their purchases. The
modeling of retailing, in particular the modeling of a retailer’s cost function builds on recent
contributions in industrial organization and agricultural economics, in particular on Sullivan
(1997), Smith (2004), Ellickson (2006, 2007), and Richards and Hamilton (2006), as well as
on an industry study by the UK Competition Commission (2000). Retailers can locate freely
anywhere on the circumference of this circle and make the following simultaneous decisions:
Whether to enter or not, what mark-ups to charge, and how many products to oﬀer. Under
some circumstances, the retailers will also charge slotting fees from manufacturing ﬁrms.
Because the market structure in retailing is determined endogenously, this framework allows
us to study how international trade aﬀects not only retail prices but also the equilibrium
number of retailers, their catchment areas and assortment sizes.
The base model is described in great detail in the next section. Then we conduct three
comparative static exercises: International trade in the form of an increase in the number
of countries integrated in the global economy (section 3), internal economic growth in the
form of an increase in the labor supply and an increase in consumer mobility in the form of
a fall in travel costs for consumers (section 4). In section 5 we show that when consumers
have a very low preference for diversity, retailers have an incentive to limit the number of
products stocked. This leads to the payment of slotting allowances and changes the way the
economy adjusts to shocks. Finally, we present a number of extensions to the base model
that illustrate how the framework can accommodate asymmetries or address policy issues.
22 A General Equilibrium Model of Retailing
Let us begin by outlining the geographical structure of our framework (Figure 1). Suppose
that the economy of a country is populated by a mass of L consumers who live on a circle
with circumference Ω around a central business district (CBD). The mass of consumers is
uniformly distributed across the circumference of this circle, so that the population density
is identical at all points and given by L/Ω.
L Consumers, evenly distributed 







Figure 1: The Symmetric Retailing Equilibrium
In order to purchase manufactured goods, consumers travel to one of R retail outlets
that are located on various points on this circle. This travel is costly so that consumers
will restrict their shopping spree to a single outlet ("one-stop shopping"). The catchment
areas of retailers (2δ) are determined endogenously by the marginal consumer who is just
indiﬀerent between two retail outlets. In a symmetric equilibrium, catchment areas are
related to the number of retail outlets because the sum of all catchment areas must add up
to the circumference of the circle:
2δR = Ω (1)
Retailers buy goods at wholesale prices from manufacturing ﬁrms located in the CBD (or
abroad) and sell them to consumers at a margin. There are N manufacturing ﬁrms in the
global economy and k identical countries. We restrict our analysis to symmetric equilibria
and discuss the impact of asymmetries in chapter 6.
2.1 Consumers
















3where x(i) are diﬀerentiated varieties of manufactured goods, σ>1 is the elasticity of
substitution between these varieties, ρ>0 captures the "love of variety",1 and tι denotes
iceberg travel costs for consumer ι. These travel costs arise because consumers have to travel
to a retail outlet to buy goods for consumption.2 The size of these travel costs depends on the
distance δι between the location of a particular retail outlet and the residence of consumer
ι,s ot h a ttι = t(δι). Because of these travel costs, consumers have a strong preference for
"one-stop shopping" and in a symmetric equilibrium run all their errands in a single shopping
trip (Stahl, 1987; Competition Commission, 2000; Smith and Hay, 2005). We assume that
travel costs are convex and use the following speciﬁc functional form:
tι =e x p( τδι).( 3 )
The retail outlets are located on various points on the circumference of the circle, so that the
distance δι can be expressed as the shortest arcdistance between the residence of the consumer
and the location of the retail outlet. Note that (3) implies tι (0) = 1 and dlntι/dlnδι =
τδι > 0. The parameter τ is a technological parameter that captures all exogenous inﬂuences
on consumer travel costs, such as infrastructure and consumer mobility.
Each consumer/worker household supplies one unit of labor. We use labor as our nu-
meraire so that the wage rate and a houshold’s income is normalized to one. Then, maximiza-
tion of (2) subject to the budget constraint
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We assume that N is large, but not large enough for producers to disregard the price index
eﬀect (Yang and Heijdra, 1993).3 Hence, the value of the price elasticity of demand is given




















in a symmetric equilibrium. The price elasticity is a weighted average of the substitution
eﬀect (σ) and the income eﬀect (1), and its value rises when N rises. The consideration of
the price index eﬀect is important for two reasons. First and foremost, it provides a rationale
for retailers to select only competitive products for their assortments in order to make their
outlets more attractive to consumers. Second, it eliminates the unsatisfactory result that
1Some readers may be more familiar with a reduced variant of U where ρ = 1
σ−1. The advantage of this
approach here is that it distinguishes explicitly between the "love-of-variety" eﬀect ρ and the elasticity of
substitution between varieties σ (Benassy, 1996; Neary, 2003).
2Throughout the analysis, we assume that direct marketing is not an option, so that manufacturing ﬁrms
need to sell their products through retailing ﬁrms.
3D’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet (1996) have pointed out that a third eﬀect exists,
the so-called income or "Ford" eﬀect. But since the price-index eﬀect and the income eﬀect work in the
same direction, we can safely ignore the latter for bravity. Instead, we assume that ﬁrms take economy-wide
parameters as given. One way to rationalize such a behavior is to think of the economy as consisting of a
continuum of identical industries.
4the mark-up charged by manufacturing ﬁr m si su n a ﬀected by the degree of competition.
2.2 Manufacturing
Manufacturing ﬁrms produce single varieties of the diﬀerentiated good under increasing
returns to scale.4 Their proﬁts (in units of labor) are given by
ΠM =( pW − β)Q − α,( 6 )
where α and β denote the ﬁxed and variable labor requirements, pW is the wholesale price
and Q denotes world market demand.
International trade is free and there are no trade costs associated with exporting to
foreign markets. Any transportation costs arising from getting products from manufacturers
to retailers can be thought of as being included in the variable cost component β.W o r l d
market demand comes from a mass of L consumers in k identical countries. Hence,
Q = kLx.( 7 )
Because retailers charge a mark-up μ, retail prices diﬀer from wholesale prices:
p =( 1+μ)pW.( 8 )
Manufacturing ﬁrms treat the retail mark-up as given. Then, using equations (5), (6) and





(σ − 1)(N − 1)
¸
.( 9 )
Note that the mark-up charged by manufacturing ﬁrms (pW/β − 1) depends on the elasticity
of substitution between varieties (σ) and on the number of manufacturing ﬁrms in the global
economy (N). The mark-up falls when N rises because demand becomes more elastic when
the number of competitors rises.
Manufacturing ﬁrms enter or exit the global market until proﬁt sa r ed r i v e nd o w nt oz e r o .
Using (4), (6), (7), (8) and (9), the condition for a free-entry proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium
in the manufacturing industry is
kL = α(1 + μ)(σN − σ +1 ).( 1 0 )
2.3 Retailing
Retailers buy products from manufacturers at the wholesale price pW and sell them with a






[p(i) − pW]x(i) − γNj (11)
4The analysis is limited to symmetric equilibria and indices are supressed for simplicity.
5The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (11) denotes a retailer’s gross proﬁts. They consist
of gross proﬁts per consumer
PNj
i=1 [p(i) − pW]x(i) times population density L/Ω over its
catchment area 2δj.
The second term, γNj, is the labor requirement necessary to provide Nj goods. We will
refer to these costs as the costs of provision. The costs of provision depend positively on the
number of varieties in the assortment (Competition Commission, 2000, in particular chaper
10 and its appendix), but are sunk in the sense that once a retailer has decided upon its
product assortment, the costs of providing these goods do not depend on the actual sales.
One can think of these costs as expenditures for in-store service personnel or labor services in
departments such as purchasing or storage (Sullivan, 1997).5 Equation (11) does not exhibit
any marginal costs of retailing. Their relevance is limited with respect to the mechanisms
described here, so we can safely ignore them.
Given the utility of consumers and their "love of variety", the product assortment oﬀered
by a retailer can be interpreted as an index of the quality of a retail outlet (Ellickson, 2006,
2007). A trip to a retail outlet with a larger assortment of products allows a consumer to
purchase a larger variety of goods and realize a higher utility. Hence, our model can be
interpreted as a model with both vertical (quality) and horizontal (location) diﬀerentiation.
Retailers maximize proﬁts by choosing the optimal mark-up μ. In a symmetric equi-
librium, the proﬁt-maximizing mark-up is identical across all products and retailers and








− 1.( 1 2 )
Note that the proﬁt-maximizing mark-up does not depend on the price elasticity of
individual products [equation (5)], but solely on the elasticity of the retailers’ catchment area
(dlnδ/dlnμ). This is because, in contrast to (single-product) manufacturing ﬁrms, retailing
ﬁrms sell a basket of goods and internalize demand linkages between these goods. A reduction
in the price of one product may increase revenues on this product, but with a binding
budget constraint consumers must ﬁnance the extra expenditures through a reduction in
expenditures on other products. This is known as the "cannibalization eﬀect" and it is
particularly relevant in the context of retailing because it implies that inframarginal revenues
(from sales to customers within a retailer’s catchment area) are independent of the retailer’s
mark-up. However, changes in the mark-up do aﬀect a retailer’s external margin, i.e. its
catchment area. A higher mark-up makes a retail outlet less attractive to consumers and
reduces the retailer’s catchment area. This is why the proﬁt-maximizing mark-up in (12)
depends on the elasticity of the catchment area δ.
The elasticity of the catchment area can be calculated by looking at the marginal con-
sumer who is just indiﬀerent between two retail outlets. Given (2), (4) and (9), the elasticity
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5More complex speciﬁcations for the costs of provision lead to qualitatively similar results as long as the
number of varieties remains an independent argument in the cost function.
6In a symmetric equilibrium, the catchment areas of all retail outlets must cover the
circumference of the circle. By substituting (13) into (12) and using (1) we can express the





.( 1 4 )
An increase in either the mobility of consumers (a fall in τ) or the density of retail outlets
(an increase in R/Ω) reduces the local monopoly power of a retailer and leads to a lower
mark-up.
There is free entry in retailing, too. Hence, in equilibrium retail proﬁts are zero: ΠR =0 .
Using equations (1), (11) and (14), the zero proﬁt condition can be expressed as
τΩ
R + τΩ
L = RγN.( 1 5 )
Note that we use the same symbol N for the product assortment of a retailer and for the
number of manufacturing ﬁrms and that the latter is determined by the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n
(10) in manufacturing. Hence, we implicitly assume that retailers take all products available
on the world market into their assortments. This is not trivial because providing products
is costly for retailers and we need to make sure that they do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to restrict
their assortment. Technically, this implies that dΠR (j)/dlnNj is positive when evaluated
at zero proﬁts. For the moment, we simply assume that this condition is satisﬁed and treat
the retailers’ assortments as being determined by the zero proﬁt condition in manufacturing.
We will come back to this in section 5 where we discuss the implications of this assumptions
and how the equilibrium is determined when this condition is not satisﬁed.
2.4 The General Equilibrium
Equations (10), (14) and (15) determine the retail mark-up μ, the number of manufacturing
ﬁrms N and the number of retailers R. Wholesale and retail prices (in units of labor, pW and
p) as well as the real wage (1/p) are then given by (8) and (9), and consumption and output
levels by (4) and (7). The labor market is in equilibrium as well. Let national labor markets
be perfectly competitive and completely segregated. The supply of labor is exogenously
given by the number of consumers/workers L. The demand for labor consists of demand
for manufacturing (N/k)(α + βQ) a n dd e m a n df o rr e t a i l i n g(RγN). Using the equilibrium
values for N, R and Q,w eﬁnd that labor markets are in equilibrium, too:
N
k






L = L (16)
In order to illustrate the equilibrium graphically we reduce the system of equations to
two equations in the number of manufacturing ﬁrms N and the number of retailers R.T h e
ﬁrst of these two is the zero proﬁt condition in the retailing industry (15). The second
equation is derived by substituting the retail mark-up (14) into the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o ni n







(σN − σ +1 ).( 1 7 )
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2. The upward sloping curve is the zero proﬁt
condition in the manufacturing industry (Πmax
M =0 ). The downward sloping curve represents








Figure 2: The General Equilibrium
The two zero proﬁt conditions in Figure 2 highlight an important diﬀerence in the re-
lationship between manufacturing ﬁrms and retailers. Retailers are the "friends" of manu-
facturing ﬁrms in the sense that proﬁts in manufacturing are increasing in the number of
retailing ﬁrms. The reason for this is that an increase in the number of retailers lowers
retail mark-ups, and this boost consumer demand for manufacturing products. The reverse
relationship has the opposite eﬀect: Manufacturing ﬁrms are the "enemies" of retailers. An
increase in the supply of diﬀerentiated manufacturing products raises the retailers’ costs of
provision, and this cost increase leads to a consolidation in the retailing industry. Hence, the
zero proﬁt condition in the retail industry creates a trade-oﬀ between diversity (the number
of products oﬀered) and the retail density.
3 International Trade
Let us think of international trade as an enlargement of the global market in the form of







Figure 3: International Trade
Graphically, the manufacturing zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n( Πmax
M =0 ) shifts to the right. This
shift resembles the traditional result of the new trade theory: For a given market structure
in retailing (R = ¯ R), an increase in the global market clearly raises the number of ﬁrms and,
thus, the number of diﬀerentiated products available for consumption. Note, however, that
N rises by less than k in relative terms: dlnN/dlnk|
Πmax
M =0
R= ¯ R =( σN − σ +1 )/(σN) < 1.
Hence, the number of ﬁrms per country, N/k, falls. There are two eﬀects: First, an increase
in k implies a larger demand (and a larger labor supply to satisfy demand), so that the
aggregate number of ﬁrms supported in the global market rises. Second, the accompanying
increase in the number of diﬀerentiated products makes demand more elastic, so that all
ﬁrms have to lower their mark-ups. Consequently, ﬁrm output rises and the increase in the
number of ﬁrms is less than proportionate to the increase in the size of the global market.
The retailing zero proﬁt condition is not directly aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nk. Technically,
this can be checked by verifying that equation (15) is indeed independent of k.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
the retailing equilibrium is not aﬀected because retailers sell ony locally and compete only
against other local retailers. Hence, an increase in the size of the global market has no direct
eﬀect on the market structure in retailing.
Figure 3 illustrates that the new equilibrium is at a higher N and a lower R.T h e
reason for the increase in the number of manufacturing ﬁrms is still the increase in global
demand (and labor supply) described above, only that this increase is now even further
dampened by adjustments in the retailing industry. These adjustments are triggered by the
increase in the number of manufactured products available on the world market. As retailers
9add new products to their assortments, their costs of provision rise, and this cost increase
leads to a consolidation in the local retail market. Hence, the number of local retailers R
falls. The increase in N is dampened by the fall in R because retail mark-ups rise, and the
accompanying increase in consumer prices partly oﬀsets the initial increase in demand.




















(R+τΩ) > 1. The mathematical solutions prove that the
number of retailers falls and that the increase in the number of manufacturing ﬁr m si sl e s s
pronounced than without adjustments in the retailing industry. This latter point can be














σN − σ +1
¶−1
< 1.
Proposition 1 International trade leads to a fall in the number of local retailers. The
aggregate number of manufacturing ﬁrms in the global economy rises.












N (2R + τΩ)
(N − 1)(σN − σ +1 )( R + τΩ)
< 0.( 1 9 )
As equation (14) shows, the retail mark-up is inversely proportionally related to the
number of retailers. Hence, as the number of retailers falls, and the distance between retailers
grows [dlnδ = −dlnR because of (1)], the local monopoly power of retailers rises. As a
consequence, retailers are able to raise their mark-ups. In manufacturing, wholesale prices
and mark-ups fall even though the number of manufacturing ﬁrms per country decreases,
too (dlnN/dlnk<1). But in contrast to retailers, manufacturing ﬁrms are competing
globally and their mark-ups depend on the degree of competition in the global economy.
As the aggregate number of manufacturing ﬁrms rises, demand becomes more elastic and
manufacturers are forced to lower their prices.
Proposition 2 International trade raises the mark-ups in retailing while mark-ups in man-
ufacturing fall.
The results in (19) convey an important message. The manufacturing industry and
the retailing industry are aﬀected in a fundamentally diﬀerent way by international trade.
Because manufacturing ﬁrms compete globally, they are confronted with a more competitive
environment when new countries join the global market. Retailers compete only locally.
Therefore, they are only indirectly aﬀected through a larger availability of manufactured
products worldwide. Because this raises their costs of provision, some retailers have to exit,
and the remaining retailers face a less competitive environment. As a consequence, the
mark-ups in manufacturing fall and those in retailing rise.
10R
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Figure 4: The Eﬀect on Consumer Prices
The fact that retail mark-ups rise is not only interesting in itself, it is also highly relevant
for the impact of international trade on consumer prices. One of the potential gains from
trade that is frequently cited from the textbook theory is that international trade lowers
prices for consumers. We have seen that wholesale prices fall indeed, but consumer (or
retail) prices (p) depend on retail mark-ups, too. And with retail mark-ups rising, the total
impact on consumer prices is ambiguous.

















∆(R + τΩ)(N − 1)(σN − σ +1 )
T 0.( 2 0 )
Obviously, equation (20) can be either positive or negative, depending on, among other
variables, the market structures in retailing and in manufacturing, R and N.I f R>
τΩ
2N[σ(N − 1)
2 − 1],t h e ndlnp/dlnk<0 and vice versa.
Figure 4 illustrates that consumer prices fall when the retail market is relatively compet-
itive compared to the manufacturing industry and rise when the manufacturing industry is
relatively more competitive. The reason for why relative competitiveness in the two indus-
tries matters for the impact of international trade on consumer prices is because it aﬀects
the size of the adjustments in the mark-ups of these two industries. The more competitive
an industry is, the less mark-ups will respond to changes in the market structure. Take
for example the Dixit-Stiglitz approximation: If N →∞ , mark-ups in manufacturing are
essentially ﬁxed by the elasticity of substitution σ. In this case, wholesale prices do not fall












S i n c ew eu s el a b o ra so u rn u m e r a i r e ,t h er e a lw a g ei sg i v e nb yt h ei n v e r s eo fc o n s u m e r
prices (1/p). Therefore, when consumer prices rise, the real wage falls and vice versa. This
implies that as a result of the adjustments in the retail industry, international trade can
actually lower real wages.
Proposition 3 The impact of international trade on consumer prices and on the real wage
is ambiguous. The real wage falls if the retail market is relatively less competitive compared
to the market structure in manufacturing.
Finally, let us address the welfare eﬀects of international trade. The fact that real wages
may fall is an important ﬁrst step in this direction. However, consumers do not only value
real income, they also value diversity. In addition, there are travel costs that diﬀer between
consumers depending on their distance to the nearest retail outlet. Average utility can be
deﬁned as ˜ U ≡ 1
δ
R δ




,w h e r e˜ t is the





. The relative change in average utility
is
dln ˜ U = ρdlnN − dlnp − dln˜ t.( 2 1 )
Equation (21) nicely illustrates the three factors determining the relative change in av-
erage utility: The ﬁrst term (ρdlnN)i st h el o v e - o f - v a r i e t ye ﬀect. It depends on the relative
change in the number of varieties (dlnN) weighed by the consumers’ preference for diversity
(the parameter ρ). The second term is the relative change in the real wage (−dlnp)a n dt h e
third term is the relative change in mean travel costs (dln˜ t).
The last term, the relative change in mean travel costs, depends on changes in the size
of the catchment area (δ) and on changes in the mobility of consumers (τ). Since there is a
strictly inverse relationship between catchment areas and the number of retailers [equation
(1)], a consolidation in retailing will raise mean travel costs. Given (3), the relative change in ˜ t
can be expressed as dln˜ t = −
t(δ)−˜ t






can be interpreted as a global measure of the curvature of travel costs.




dlnk − dln˜ t
dlnk and is ambiguous. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side, the love-of-variety eﬀect,
is clearly positive. The last term, the travel cost eﬀect, is clearly negative. And the term in
the middle, the change in the real wage, is itself ambiguous.



























Equation (22) shows that the change in average utility can be traced back to the under-
lying changes in the market structure in manufacturing and retailing. The ﬁrst term, the
12increase in the global number of manufacturing ﬁrms, clearly raises average utility because
of two eﬀects: First, the increase in the number of ﬁrms raises the number of diﬀerentiated
products available in the world market, and consumers value diversity (love-of-variety ef-
fect). Second, the increase in competition among manufactured ﬁrms lowers manufacturing
mark-ups, and this tends to lower prices and raise real wages (competition eﬀect). These two
eﬀects are well known from the New Trade Theory. The second term in (22), the decrease
in the number of local retailers, is new. Again, there are two eﬀects, both of which lower
average utility: First, the consolidation in retailing allows retailers to increase their mark-
ups. This tends to raise prices and lower real wages (retail mark-up eﬀect). And second, the
average distance between retailers rises, so that consumers have to travel longer distances to
run their errands (travel cost eﬀect). The sum of all these eﬀects may be positive or negative,
depending on their relative sizes.
Proposition 4 The aggregate welfare eﬀect of international trade is ambiguous. The love-
of-variety eﬀect and the competition eﬀect in manufacturing tend to raise welfare, while the
retail mark-up eﬀe c ta n dt h et r a v e lc o s te ﬀe c tt e n dt ol o w e rw e l f a r e .
4 Internal Economic Growth and Increase in Consumer
Mobility
Aside from analyzing the impact of international trade, we are also able to study how (a)
internal economic growth (in the form of an increase in the population L)a n d(b) an increase
in consumer mobility (a fall in τ)a ﬀect the retailing industry.
(a) We begin by looking at an increase in L.I no u rR−N diagram, an increase in L leads
to an outward shift of both zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n s ,b u tt h es h i f to ft h er e t a i ll o c u si sl a r g e r








R= ¯ R = σN−σ+1
σN < 1.
The new equilibrium is at a larger number of manufacturing ﬁrms and a larger number of
retailers.
In many models of intra-industry trade, an increase in the size of the global market and
an increase in the size of a local market have isomorphic eﬀects on the market structure in
manufacturing (Krugman, 1979). Our analysis shows that the two shocks are quite diﬀerent
in their eﬀect on the retail market. The reason for this is that internal economic growth
aﬀects retailers directly by aﬀecting local demand for retail services, whereas external growth
aﬀects retailing only indirectly. Speciﬁcally, an increase in L raises the population density
and boosts local sales. As a consequence, local retailers make more proﬁts (c.p.), and this
leads to additional entry in retailing.
The manufacturing locus shifts outwards, too, because the increase in L implies also an
increase in demand for manufacturing products. However, a note of caution is in order: In
the symmetric setup chosen here (and in the mathematical derivative of the outward shift
above), an increase in L implies that the population in all countries increases. This is in a
way unsatisfactory because it combines internal economic growth (an increase in the local
population) with external growth (an increase in the population in all other countries). Thus,
the outward shift of the manufacturing locus shown here is stronger than it would be if only







Figure 5: Internal Economic Growth
of countries, the increase in L in a single country would have no eﬀect on aggregate demand
for manufacturing ﬁrms in the global economy, and the manufacturing locus would remain
unaﬀected in this case. However, a quick glance at Figure 5 also reveals that making this
diﬀerentiation is only important quantitatively and not qualitatively.
Because the equilibrium numbers of both manufacturers and retailers rise, the mark-ups
in the two industries fall. In this case, the impact on consumer prices is unambiguously
negative and the real wage rises. Since mean travel costs also fall in response to an increase
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Proposition 5 Internal economic growth raises the number of both retailers and manufac-
turers. Mark-ups in both industries fall and the real wage as well as welfare rise unambigu-
ously.
The core diﬀerence between an increase in the number of countries in the global economy
(k) and an increase in the size of the population (L) is that the former has no direct impact
on the retailing industry whereas the latter aﬀects retailers directly t h r o u g ha ni n c r e a s ei n
local sales.
(b) Let us now consider an increase in the mobility of consumers in the form of a fall







Figure 6: Increase in Consumer Mobility
lower absolute and marginal travel costs for any δι > 0. A fall in τ shifts both zero proﬁt
conditions downwards in our R−N diagram. The shift of the manufacturing locus is larger
than the shift of the retailing locus (dlnR/dlnτ|
Πmax
M =0
N= ¯ N = −1 and dlnR/dlnτ|
Πmax
R =0
N= ¯ N =
−R/(2R + τΩ) > −1), so that the new equilibrium is at a higher N and a lower R.
The market structure eﬀects of an increase in consumer mobility are similar to those of
international trade. Both lead to an expansion in the aggregate number of manufacturing
ﬁrms (and products) and a consolidation in the retailing industry. Wholesale prices (pW)a l s o
fall in both scenarios. However, there is a decisive diﬀerence in how these two shocks aﬀect
retail margins. While retail margins rise when the global economy grows, they actually
fall when consumers become more mobile. To see this note ﬁrst that the decrease in the
number of retailers is less than proportionate: dlnR/dlnτ<1. Then, (14) implies that
dlnμ/dlnτ =1− dlnR/dlnτ>0. Hence, a fall in τ pushes retail margins down.
The reason for why retail margins fall when consumer mobility rises is that a fall in
travel costs makes a retailer’s demand more elastic. When consumers are more mobile, they
respond more easily to changes in prices. As a consequence, a retailer’s optimal mark-up
falls. This leads to a consolidation in the retail industry until the surviving retailers can
make up in catchment areas for what they lost in margins.
An increase in consumer mobility leads to a consolidation in the retail sector because
it lowers retail margins by raising the price elasticity of demand. This is a demand side
shock. International trade leads to higher retail margins because the increase in the costs of
provision lead to a consolidation in the retail sector. This is a supply side shock. Therefore,
15even though both shocks have the same impact on the market structure in retailing, their
impact on mark-ups is distinctly diﬀerent.
Having established that a fall in τ leads to lower mark-ups, the analysis of consumer
prices and welfare is essentially straightforward. Since wholesale prices fall in response to
the increase in N, consumer prices must also fall. Finally, the indirect eﬀect of larger
catchment areas on travel costs is dominated by the direct eﬀect of a lower τ (dln˜ t/dlnτ =
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Proposition 6 An increase in consumer mobility leads to an increase in the number of man-
ufacturing ﬁrms and a decrease in the number of retailers. Mark-ups fall in both industries,
so that consumer prices also fall (the real wage rises) and welfare rises unambiguously.
When comparing our results in the previous two sections with the stylized facts presented
i nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o nw en o t i c et h a tt w os h o c k sa p p e a rt om a t c ho u ro b s e r v a t i o n s .B o t hi n t e r -
national trade and an increase in consumer mobility are predicted to lead to a simultaneous
increase in the number of products stocked and a fall in the number of retail outlets. But
only our international trade shock is also consistent with an increase in retail margins. Nat-
urally, this is no proof that international trade is responsible (let alone solely responsible) for
the developments in the retail industries. This is ultimately an empirical question. However,
we can conjecture that international trade may be an important driver of these phenomena.
5 Assortment Sizes and Slotting Allowances
In section 2.3 we assumed that retailers ﬁnd it always proﬁtable to add products to their
assortments when they become available on the world market. We have already pointed out
that this assumption is not trivial because the provision of goods is costly. In this section we
want to discuss the conditions under which this assumption is valid and how the equilibrium
is determined when retailers wish to restrict their assortment sizes.
First, we calculate the proﬁt maximizing product assortment of a retailer by assuming
that retailers choose mark-ups and assortments simultaneously. An increase in a retailer’s
assortment raises its costs of provision, but it also makes the outlet more attractive for
consumers because it oﬀers more choices. These two eﬀects must be weighed against each
other. The proﬁt maximizing assortment size (denoted by an asterisk) N∗ and the corre-
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In a symmetric equilibrium, the assortment size in retailing must be identical to the
16number of manufacturing ﬁrms in the global economy.6 Hence, the proﬁt maximizing product
assortment in retailing and the zero proﬁt condition in manufacturing are two competing
conditions for the determination of N, only one of which can be binding. By comparing
(25) with (15) and (17) we ﬁnd that the proﬁt maximizing assortment is binding if ρ is
below a certain threshold ρ<˘ ρ.7 If consumers have a high "love of variety" (ρ>˘ ρ), they
respond strongly in their outlet decisions to changes in a retailer’s assortment size. In this
case, retailers ﬁnd it proﬁt a b l et ot a k ea sm a n yp r o d u c t sa sp o s s i b l ei n t ot h e i ra s s o r t m e n t s
and the number of manufactured products is determined by the zero proﬁt condition in
manufacturing. But if consumers have a low "love of variety" (ρ<˘ ρ), they look primarily
for low retail prices. In that case, the costs of adding products to a retailer’s assortment
dominate the advantage of a larger assortment, so that retailers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to limit
the range of products oﬀered.
If the proﬁt maximizing assortment is binding (ρ<˘ ρ), retailing ﬁrms create an arti-
ﬁcial bottleneck that generates scarcity rents for manufacturing ﬁrms because the number
of products listed in the retail assortment is smaller and the wholesale price is higher than
in the equilibrium with zero proﬁts. However, these scarcity rents cannot be appropriated
by the manufacturers. Without barriers to entry, manufacturing ﬁrms not listed will ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to oﬀer "slotting allowances"8 to retailers in order to have their products placed
on their shelves. The ensuing competition between manufacturers for the scarce retail shelve
space raises these slotting allowances until proﬁts in manufacturing are driven down to zero.
The payment of slotting allowances by manufacturing ﬁrms to retailers suggests that
the scarcity rents are passed on to the retailing ﬁrms. However, these rents cannot be
appropriated by retailers, either. Without barriers to entry in retailing, retailers are not
only competing against their neighboring rivals, they are also competing against potential
entry at their own location. Hence, the slotting allowances paid by manufacturing ﬁrms are
p a s s e do nt oﬁnal consumers.
In reality, slotting allowances usually take the form of either cash payments or free goods.
Here, it is most convenient to think of slotting allowances as of the "iceberg" type, i.e.
manufacturing ﬁrms ship out a larger quantity of goods than what they get paid for: ΠM (i)=
[pW (i) − βs(i)]Q(i)−α,w h e r es(i) > 1 are the iceberg slotting allowances. Note, however,
that in contrast to transportation costs, slotting allowances are not variable costs but ﬁxed
payments in units of goods. As a type of market entry fee they do not enter into the ﬁrm’s
pricing decision, so that the wholesale price pW (i) c o n t i n u e st ob ed e t e r m i n e db ye q u a t i o n
(9).
Technically, we assume that manufacturing ﬁr m sc h o o s ep r i c e sa n ds l o t t i n ga l l o w a n c e s
simultaneously. While ﬁnal consumers perceive the various manufactured products as dif-
ferentiated and care about the diversity oﬀered by local retailers, they do not care about
the composition of this diversity. Hence, when it comes to adding varieties to a retailer’s
6Because of economies of scale, a manufacturer serving all retailers can always charge a price below the
average costs of a manufacturer serving only a subset of retailers. Therefore, in equilibrium all manufacturing
products are listed with all retailers.
7See equation (46) in Appendix 8.4.
8“’Slotting allowances’ are one class of payments that may be made for shelf access. They are lump-sum,
up-front payments from a manufacturer (...) to a retailer to have a new product carried by the retailer and
placed on its shelves." (Federal Trade Commission, 2001, p.1).
17assortment, the diﬀerent manufactured products are essentially perfect substitutes. As a
consequence, the competition between manufacturers for the scarce retail space is Bertrand
in nature and slotting allowances rise until eﬀective prices (net of slotting allowances, pW/s)
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Consumers are the beneﬁciaries of these slotting allowances. For every unit they purchase
they get s − 1 u n i t sf o rf r e e( " t a k eo n e ,g e ts − 1 for free" oﬀers). Average utility is then
given by ˜ U = Nρ (s/p)/˜ t,w h e r es/p is the eﬀective real wage (including slotting allowances):
s/p =
£




W es e et h a ti ft h ep r o ﬁt maximizing assortment is binding, the determination of the
equilibrium is quite diﬀerent. It also has profound eﬀects on how the markets respond to
shocks:
Proposition 7 International trade: If consumers have a low "love of variety" (ρ<˘ ρ), an
increase in the number of countries (k) has no impact on the market structure in retailing or
in manufacturing. However, consumers are better oﬀ because of larger slotting allowances.
From the explicit solutions of N∗, R∗ and μ∗ in (25) it is immediately obvious that all
three parameters are unaﬀected by changes in k. Just as in the previous section there is no
direct eﬀect of a change in k on the retailing sector because retailers sell only locally. But
in contrast to the previous section, there is no indirect eﬀect via entry in the manufacturing
industry, either, because the equilibrium number of products and ﬁr m si sd e t e r m i n e di nt h e
retailing sector as well. An increase in k still makes manufacturing more proﬁtable, but this
does not lead to entry but to an increase in slotting allowances. Log diﬀerentiation of (26)
yields dlns∗/dlnk =( 1+ρ) αN∗
kL /
£
1 − (1 + ρ) αN∗
kL
¤
> 0. As a consequence, average utility
rises even though N, p and ˜ t all remain constant: dln ˜ U/dlnk = dlns∗/dlnk>0.
This is an important result. It shows that a larger international market does not neces-
sarily lead to an increase in the local choices for consumers. This depends on whether local
retailers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to expand their assortments. If they do, we have seen in the pre-
vious section that this may lead to a consolidation in the retailing industry with ambiguous
welfare eﬀects. If they do not, then the analysis in this section shows that market structures
and prices in both retailing and manufacturing remain unaﬀected. However, consumers are
better oﬀ because they beneﬁtf r o mt h eﬁercer global competition between manufacturers
for the scarce retail space that leads to an increase in slotting allowances.
Note that the result of locally constant assortments does not contradict studies empha-
sizing the growth in imported varieties (e.g., Broda and Weinstein, 2006). In our symmetric
setup the share of imported varieties is given by (k − 1)/k, and this is clearly increasing in
k irrespective of how the market structure in manufacturing adjusts. In the case where as-
sortments remain constant, an increase in k leads to a proportional decrease in N/k. Hence,
an increase in the share of imported varieties leads to a change in the composition of local
retail assortments. However, our results also indicate that one must exercise extreme caution
when drawing welfare implications from the fact that more varieties are imported.
Analyzing other shocks (internal growth, mobility) is also straightforward:
18Proposition 8 (a) Internal growth: An increase in L leads to larger assortments and higher
slotting allowances, but leaves the market structure in retailing unaﬀected. (b) Mobility: A
fall in τ leads to larger assortments and a consolidation in the retailing sector. Slotting
allowances fall.
Proof. Log diﬀerentiation of (25) and (26) yields (a) dlnN∗/dlnL =1 , dlnR∗/dlnL =0 ,
and dlns∗/dlnL>0; (b) dlnN∗/dlnτ = −1, dlnR∗/dlnτ =1 ,a n ddlns∗/dlnτ>0.
We see that shocks that have a direct impact on the retailing sector also have an impact
on the size of the assortments. An increase in L raises local demand for retailing services,
and this leads to a corresponding increase in the size of assortments. A fall in τ reduces travel
costs and makes demand for retailing services more elastic. This leads to a consolidation
in the retailing sector that in turn allows retailers to increase their assortment sizes. These
results are qualitatively similar to the results in the previous section.
6E x t e n s i o n s
This framework can be extended in various directions. Following Melitz (2003), a by now
popular extension is to introduce heterogeneity in the productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms.
In principal, this could be done here as well, but would not lead to new insights regarding
the adjustments in the retailing industry.9 Instead, we focus on two asymmetries that have
a direct impact on the retailing industries: Consumers’ preference for diversity and zoning
regulations. In addition, we present a simple extension with a market for housing and rents.
6.1 Asymmetric Preferences for Diversity
Suppose that all countries are identical except for their consumers’ "love of variety", so that
the parameter ρ = ρ(i) is country speciﬁc. Then, countries with a high ρ are governed by
the regime described in section 2.4 and countries with a low ρ are governed by the regime
described in the previous section. The critical country ˇ k is determined in Figure 7, where
κ(ρ) is the sum of all countries with a ρ(i) ≥ ρ,a n d˘ ρ(k) is taken from equation (46) in





as diversity-loving countries, or just D countries, and countries with a low "love of variety"




] as sales-loving countries (S countries).
The market structures in manufacturing and in retailing in all D countries are given
by equations (15) and (17) with k = ˘ k. In these countries, retailers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
include all products available on the world market into their assortments. Hence, their
market structures are all identical. The number of manufacturing ﬁrms (and products)
in these countries is constrained by the size of the market (˘ k)a n db yt h eﬁxed costs in
manufacturing.
9Because of complete cannibalization, neither retail mark-ups nor assortment sizes depend on the costs
in manufacturing. Hence, introducing heterogeneous manufacturers leads to the well known selection eﬀects













Figure 7: Mixed Regime
The market structures in all S countries is given by equations (25) with ρ = ρ(i) for




then the size of retail assortments and the
market structure in retailing depend on ρ and are thus diﬀerent across countries. Countries
with a strictly lower "love of variety" [ρ(i) <ρ(j)] have strictly smaller retail assortments
[N (i) <N(j)] and strictly more competitive retail markets [R(i) >R(j) and μ(i) <μ(j)].
The market structures in the two types of countries are illustrated in Figure 8.











(σN − σ +1 )[the Πmax
R =0locus is as in (15)]. The
diagram on the right illustrates the market structure of one particular S economy i.H e r e ,
the dΠR/dN =0locus is given by γN (i)[R(i)+τΩ]=ρ(i)L.10 Note that the location of
the dΠR/dN =0curve depends on the country speciﬁc parameter ρ(i).Al o w e rρ(i) implies
that this locus shifts to the left as indicated by the grey dashed lines.
Because entry into the S markets is restricted, manufacturing ﬁrms have to cover their
ﬁxed costs (α)i nt h eD markets and pay slotting allowances to retailers in the S markets.
With ﬁxed costs covered in D, slotting allowances in S will rise until eﬀective prices are
down to marginal costs:
s(i)=
σ[N (i) − 1] + 1
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Figure 8: Market Structures in the Mixed Regime
N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tt h ef a c tt h a tﬁxed costs are covered in D does not mean that ﬁrms
are located in D.I t s i m p l y m e a n s t h a t ﬁxed costs are paid out of revenues generated in
these markets. Since labor is immobile internationally, and labor markets have to clear at
a national level, an equilibrium with agglomeration is not possible and ﬁrms remain spread
out across all countries.
The eﬀects of international trade now depend on the type of countries integrated:
Proposition 9 (a) An increase in the number of D countries (an increase in ˘ k) has asym-
metric eﬀects on the two types of countries. In all D countries, the number of manufactured
products available to consumers rises and the number of retail outlet falls. The impact on
welfare is ambiguous depending on the four eﬀects described in (22). In S countries, the mar-
ket structure in retailing and the sizes of assortments are unaﬀected. As slotting allowances
do not change, either, welfare is unaﬀected. (b) An increase in the number of S countries
(an increase in k − ˘ k while ˘ k remains constant) has neither market structure eﬀects nor
welfare eﬀects in either type of country. Irrespective of the diﬀerent market structure eﬀects,
the share of imported varieties in local assortments increases in all cases.





=0locus in Figure 8.
The Πmax
R =0and dΠR/dN =0loci are unaﬀected. As shown in (27), slotting allowances






not shifted, either. Then, the increase in k − ˘ k has no eﬀect on the market structures in
either type of country.
These results illustrate how (endogenously determined) diﬀerences in retail market struc-
tures aﬀect how countries adjust to increasing global markets. It also shows that neither an
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Figure 9: Zoning Regulations
of traded varieties are suﬃcient conditions for the realization of gains from diversity by local
consumers.
6.2 Zoning Regulations
Many countries use zoning regulations to regulate the land use in primarily urban areas.
These zoning regulations can act as a barrier to entry and aﬀect the market structure in
national retail markets (Gable et al., 1995; OECD, 2000; Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2001).
Suppose that a national or regional zoning regulation aims at ensuring a high local retail
density. For this purpose, it speciﬁes a maximum distance between two retailers. In our setup
this is equivalent to regulating the maximum catchment areas of individual retail outlets.
Hence, let us assume that an administration sets a ¯ δZ and that this zoning regulation is
binding in the sense that ¯ δZ <δ
equilibrium. This situation is illustrated graphically in Figure
9 for a diversity-loving country.
The diagram on the left is a graphical illustration of equation (1) in a δ − R space.
The diagram on the right is basically a replica of Figure 2. The main insight to be gained
from this diagram is that zoning regulations do not only regulate the spatial distribution of
retailing, but they also aﬀect the market structure in retailing and the number of products
stocked by retailers. If the zoning regulation is binding, the distance between retailers is
s m a l l e rt h a ni tw o u l db ew i t h o u tt h er e g u l a t i o n .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h e r ea r em o r er e t a i l e r s
with lower retail mark-ups. As a consequence, each retailer has a smaller assortment than
without the zoning regulation.
Since the zoning regulation determines the market structure in the retailing industry, this
market structure can no longer adjust to shocks. Hence, if the zoning regulation is binding,
22the impact of international trade on the local availability of goods is similar in nature to the
case where retailers limit the number of goods. It has no eﬀects on the number of products
stocked or on the retail density. It only changes the composition of assortments and the
slotting allowances paid by manufacturers.
6.3 Market for Housing and Rents
The last extension deals with our geographical framework. In section 2 we assume that
consumers are uniformly distributed across the circumference of the circle. What we do
not state explicitly but assume implicitly is that consumers cannot move to other locations.
Let us now consider to what extent our results depend on this particular assumption by
introducing a market for housing and allowing consumers to move.
Let consumers choose their location based on the utility of living in this location and the
rental price of housing. Assume that each consumer requires one unit of housing and that he
or she pays a rent of r to a housing society. Ownership of this society is dispersed among the
population so that rent income stays within the country. We assume that housing requires
land of zero mass in order to ensure that demand for land by a mass of consumers (L)i s
ﬁnite.
The log of utility of a consumer living in location ι is then given by lnUι = ρlnN −lnp−
lntι − lnrι. A moving equilibrium requires that utility is identical across locations:
lnrι − lnrκ =l ntι − lntκ ∀ ι 6= κ.( 2 8 )
The economic intuition is straightforward: Since travel costs are the only diﬀerences between
locations, they determine the diﬀerences in rental prices.
Given equation (28), it is clear that any change in travel costs for a particular location will
be oﬀset by corresponding changes in land rents. If the distance between retailers rises as a
consequence of international trade, then this will not lower the utility of consumers because
they are compensated for the increase in travel costs by lower rental prices for housing.
Hence, the travel cost eﬀect disappears.
The disappearance of the travel cost eﬀe c td o e sn o tr e s o l v et h ea m b i g u i t yo ft h ew e l f a r e
eﬀects. As the negative retail mark-up eﬀect prevails, there are still positive and negative
eﬀects pulling in diﬀerent directions. But the explicit consideration of a housing market does
make a positive welfare eﬀect more likely.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This study analyzes how the retail industry adjusts to global shocks and how these adjust-
ments aﬀect the welfare implications of those shocks. The starting point of the analysis is
the realization that a free entry equilibrium in retailing creates a trade-oﬀ between diversity
(the number of products stocked) and the retail density (the number of retail outlets in a
given geographical area). This trade-oﬀ is caused by the fact that providing goods is costly
for retailers and that an increase in these costs of provision reduces the number of retailers
that a given market can support.
23The New Trade Theory predicts that an enlargement of the global market lowers prices for
consumers and expands the choices available to them. Our results show that both predictions
do not necessarily hold if adjustments in the retail industry are taken into account. First of
all, the choices available to local consumers may not rise even if the number of manufacturing
ﬁrms in the global market rises because local retailers may not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to expand
their assortment sizes. Our analysis shows that this is the case if local consumers have a
low preference for diversity. Second, consumer prices may rise even though producer prices
fall because retail mark-ups rise in response to a consolidation in the retail industry. Our
analysis shows that this can happen when the market structure in retailing is less competitive
relative to the market structure in manufacturing.
In the introduction we presented a number of stylized facts concerning the recent devel-
opments in the retailing industries of industrialized countries. Among those were an increase
in the assortment sizes and a fall in the number of outlets. Our analysis provides two pos-
sible explanations for these outcomes: International trade and consumer mobility. Both
shocks lead to an increase in the number of products stocked (at least for countries with a
high preference for diversity) and a reduction in the number of retail outlets. Which one of
these two shocks is ultimately driving our observations is, of course, an empirical question.
However, our theoretical results enable us to identify an important diﬀerence between the
two shocks: International trade tends to raise mark-ups in retailing while consumer mobility
tends to lower them. Since there is evidence that retail gross margins have indeed risen over
the past decades, we can conjecture that international trade may be an important driver of
the developments in the retailing sectors.
In order to integrate retailing into a general equilibrium model of international trade we
have to greatly simplify the way retailers interact with both consumers and manufacturers.
In particular, our assumption of a monopolistically competitive retail industry circumvents
all strategic issues between retailers and suppliers, and the assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz pref-
erences in combination with one-stop shopping prevents an analysis of vertical diﬀerentiation
in retail formats (discounters, specialty shops etc.). These issues are certainly important and
should take center stage for future research. But in exchange for leaving out these issues
we obtain a fairly simple framework that allows us to study how the market structure in
retailing interacts with the market structure in manufacturing. Our results help to gain a







pW (i) and equations (4) and (9), a retailer’s revenues on individual
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¤1−σ − γNj (30)
By taking the derivative of the retailer’s proﬁts with respect to the mark-up of an indi-




















































and can be rearranged as in (12).
The elasticity of the catchment area with respect to the mark-up and the assortment
size can be calculated by adapting the approach in Helpman (1981). Using (4) and (9), the
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25where D is the distance between retailers j and j +1 ,s ot h a tδj+1 = D − δj.B y t a k i n g
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8.2 Comparative Statics
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By applying Cramer’s rule we obtain the solutions shown in the text.
The result for the change in the retail mark-up follows from (14):
dlnμ = dlnτ − dlnR.( 3 9 )
The percentage change in the wholesale price is derived from taking log-diﬀerentials of (9):
dlnpW = −
N
(N − 1)(σN − σ +1 )
dlnN.( 4 0 )
268.3 Proﬁt Maximizing Assortment Size











By using (1) and (14) and imposing symmetry, the optimal assortment size dΠR (j)/dlnNj =








.( 4 2 )
Here, on the left hand side are a retailer’s marginal costs of a percentage increase in N
(the costs of provision) and on the right hand side are marginal revenues (due to a larger
catchment area).
The elasticity of the catchment area with respect to the assortment size (dlnδ/dlnN)
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Equations (15) and (44) can be solved for the optimal N∗ and R∗. The corresponding
mark-up μ∗ then follows from (14).
8.4 Slotting Allowances
A manufacturers proﬁts without slotting allowances are given by ΠM =[ pW (i) − β]Q(i)−α
and can be expressed in a symmetric equilibrium as
ΠM =
kL
(1 + μ)(σN − σ +1 )
− α (45)
If the proﬁt maximizing assortment is binding, then these proﬁts are positive when eval-
uated at μ∗ and N∗ f r o m( 2 5 ) .T h i si st h ec a s ei fkL > α
h
σρ2L































If condition (46) holds, manufacturing ﬁrms are willing to oﬀer slotting allowances in
order to be listed with the retailing ﬁrms. These slotting allowances are paid in free goods,
so that a manufacturer agrees to deliver s − 1 units for free in order to get access to the
retailing shelves: ΠM =[ pW − β]Q − α − (s − 1)βQ.P r o ﬁts can then be expressed as
ΠM (s,N,kL,μ,α)=
[(1 − s)(σ − 1)(N − 1) + N]kL
[(σ − 1)(N − 1) + N](1+μ)N
− α.( 4 7 )
27These proﬁts are positive when evaluated at N∗ and μ∗ and are decreasing in s.T h ee q u i -
librium slotting allowances push proﬁts down to zero, ΠM (s∗,N∗,kL,μ ∗,α)=0 ,a n dc a nb e








σ(N∗ − 1) + 1
(σ − 1)(N∗ − 1)
(48)
With s∗ the labor market is in equilibrium as well. Because slotting allowances are paid












L = L (49)
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